講演抄録/キーワード |
講演名 |
2010-03-03 09:00
Network MIMO As A Bargaining Game ○Oussama Souihli・Tomoaki Ohtsuki(Keio Univ.) RCS2009-266 |
抄録 |
(和) |
A mobile station (MS) is on the edge of a network cell, such that it can receive signals from the current Base Station (BS), $BS_1$ and a neighboring BS, $BS_2$. To avoid inter-cell interference on the cell-edge MS, the network operator wants to use ツ・textbf{both} BSs to send data to MS, in an Network-MIMO fashion. Under such framework, we state the power allocation problem as follows: ツ・textit{ツ・textbf{How much transmit power $p_1$, $p_2$, should each BS use such that the total signal received by MS has a guaranteed quality}} ツ・textbf{SNR ツ・textit{= $ツ・gamma_0$} dB} ?
We attempt, in this report, to answer this question from two different perspectives. In the first, we study the power allocation problem as a constrained global optimization problem, where the aim is to minimize the total transmit power (the sum of the transmit powers of the BSs) under the receive signal quality constraint. In the second approach, we study the power allocation problem from a cooperative game theory perspective, by viewing the problem as a bargaining game in which the players (the BSs) aim at minimizing their respective transmit powers only. By deriving closed-form expressions of the optimal transmit powers for each approach, we find two main differences between them. First, in the global optimization approach, the required transmit powers from each BS are function of the noise levels of both channels, while in the bargaining game approach, these are function of their respective noises ツ・textit{only}, thereby characterizing the selfish behavior of the players. Second, the bargaining approach favors the BS with the better channel conditions (by requiring less power from this BS, w.r.t. the global optimization approach |
(英) |
A mobile station (MS) is on the edge of a network cell, such that it can receive signals from the current Base Station (BS), $BS_1$ and a neighboring BS, $BS_2$. To avoid inter-cell interference on the cell-edge MS, the network operator wants to use ツ・textbf{both} BSs to send data to MS, in an Network-MIMO fashion. Under such framework, we state the power allocation problem as follows: ツ・textit{ツ・textbf{How much transmit power $p_1$, $p_2$, should each BS use such that the total signal received by MS has a guaranteed quality}} ツ・textbf{SNR ツ・textit{= $ツ・gamma_0$} dB} ?
We attempt, in this report, to answer this question from two different perspectives. In the first, we study the power allocation problem as a constrained global optimization problem, where the aim is to minimize the total transmit power (the sum of the transmit powers of the BSs) under the receive signal quality constraint. In the second approach, we study the power allocation problem from a cooperative game theory perspective, by viewing the problem as a bargaining game in which the players (the BSs) aim at minimizing their respective transmit powers only. By deriving closed-form expressions of the optimal transmit powers for each approach, we find two main differences between them. First, in the global optimization approach, the required transmit powers from each BS are function of the noise levels of both channels, while in the bargaining game approach, these are function of their respective noises ツ・textit{only}, thereby characterizing the selfish behavior of the players. Second, the bargaining approach favors the BS with the better channel conditions (by requiring less power from this BS, w.r.t. the global optimization approach |
キーワード |
(和) |
Network MIMO / Cooperative Communications / Power Allocation / Game Theory / / / / |
(英) |
Network MIMO / Cooperative Communications / Power Allocation / Game Theory / / / / |
文献情報 |
信学技報, vol. 109, no. 440, RCS2009-266, pp. 53-58, 2010年3月. |
資料番号 |
RCS2009-266 |
発行日 |
2010-02-24 (RCS) |
ISSN |
Print edition: ISSN 0913-5685 Online edition: ISSN 2432-6380 |
著作権に ついて |
技術研究報告に掲載された論文の著作権は電子情報通信学会に帰属します.(許諾番号:10GA0019/12GB0052/13GB0056/17GB0034/18GB0034) |
PDFダウンロード |
RCS2009-266 |
研究会情報 |
研究会 |
RCS AN MoNA SR |
開催期間 |
2010-03-03 - 2010-03-05 |
開催地(和) |
YRP |
開催地(英) |
YRP |
テーマ(和) |
移動通信ワークショップ |
テーマ(英) |
Mobile Communication Workshop |
講演論文情報の詳細 |
申込み研究会 |
RCS |
会議コード |
2010-03-RCS-AN-MoMuC-SR |
本文の言語 |
英語 |
タイトル(和) |
|
サブタイトル(和) |
|
タイトル(英) |
Network MIMO As A Bargaining Game |
サブタイトル(英) |
|
キーワード(1)(和/英) |
Network MIMO / Network MIMO |
キーワード(2)(和/英) |
Cooperative Communications / Cooperative Communications |
キーワード(3)(和/英) |
Power Allocation / Power Allocation |
キーワード(4)(和/英) |
Game Theory / Game Theory |
キーワード(5)(和/英) |
/ |
キーワード(6)(和/英) |
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キーワード(7)(和/英) |
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キーワード(8)(和/英) |
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第1著者 氏名(和/英/ヨミ) |
Oussama Souihli / Oussama Souihli / |
第1著者 所属(和/英) |
慶応義塾大学大学院理工学部 (略称: 慶大)
Keio University (略称: Keio Univ.) |
第2著者 氏名(和/英/ヨミ) |
Tomoaki Ohtsuki / Tomoaki Ohtsuki / |
第2著者 所属(和/英) |
慶応義塾大学大学院理工学部 (略称: 慶大)
Keio University (略称: Keio Univ.) |
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講演者 |
第1著者 |
発表日時 |
2010-03-03 09:00:00 |
発表時間 |
20分 |
申込先研究会 |
RCS |
資料番号 |
RCS2009-266 |
巻番号(vol) |
vol.109 |
号番号(no) |
no.440 |
ページ範囲 |
pp.53-58 |
ページ数 |
6 |
発行日 |
2010-02-24 (RCS) |
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