| （英） |
Infrastructure sharing is considered a potential cost-effective solution for solving the overflow demand problem in cellular networks. In this paper, we design a repeated principal-agent model for the scenarios where principal who is an operator with overflow demand wants some of its users to be served by agent who is another operator with enough resource. In our model, an agent receives lease fee for the use of its own radio resource and energy to serve principal’s users, and the principal receives service for own users by paying lease fee. In general operators cannot directly observe other operator’s status such as resource sharing level and user satisfaction (QoE: Quality of Experience) level. In addition, traffic volume of wireless networks is dynamic and user’s QoE is subjective. These uncertainties may lead to misunderstanding of other operator’s behavior with respect to the quality of service actually provided, and finally may cause uncooperative relationship, i.e. the agent does not share any resource and the principal does not pay any fee. In this paper, we design a repeated game model with imperfect monitoring. In addition, we propose random reset signal to return to cooperative relationship if operators turn into uncooperative relationship. In order to return to cooperative relationship, we employ reset signal randomly sent from a cooperation coordinator. Our computer simulations results show that using the proposed model it is possible to achieve efficient cooperation for the two operators. |